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PREEMPTION OR PRESERVATION OF
STATE REMEDIES UNDER ERISA? THE
NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS
PRESERVES A STATE REMEDY IN SASSO
V. VA CHRIS
The interests of employees in welfare benefit and pension
plans are federally protected by the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).1 With the enactment of ERISA,
Congress intended to preempt state regulation of employee benefit
plans. 2 Section 514(a) of the Act states that ERISA's provisions
Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982)).
Congress saw the need to establish minimum standards for employee benefit plans to insure
that employees and their beneficiaries were not deprived of benefits owed to them under
such plans. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982). This legislation assured that those who had worked
all their lives would have adequate income to meet their retirement needs. See H.R. REP.
No. 12906, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); Hutchinson & Ifshin, Federal Preemption of State
Law Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 23,
23 (1978); Note, ERISA Preemption of State Law: The Meaning of "Relate to" in Section
514, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 143, 143.
ERISA regulates both employee welfare benefit plans and employee pension benefit
plans. 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (1982). An "employee welfare benefit plan" is defined as any plan
established:
for the purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the
purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or bene-
fits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemploy-
ment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care
centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services, or (B) any benefit described
in section 186(c) of this title (other than pensions on retirement or death, and
insurance to provide such pensions) (citation omitted).
29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1982).
An "employee pension benefit plan" is defined as any plan established:
by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that...
such plan, fund, or program-
(i) provides retirement income to employees, or
(ii) results in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the
termination of covered employment or beyond, regardless of the method of calcu-
lating the contributions made to the plan, the method of calculating the benefits
under the plan or the method of distributing benefits from the plan.
29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (1982).
Certain employee benefit plans, such as governmental plans, church plans, plans main-
tained outside the United States primarily for the benefit of aliens, and excess benefit plans,
are exempted from ERISA coverage. See 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b) (1982).
1 See infra note 3.
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"shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan" covered by ERISA'
This mandate of preemption is unique in that the intent of Con-
gress to preempt state law turns on a question of statutory con-
struction - whether a law "relate[s] to" an ERISA benefit plan.4
' 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982). ERISA's preemption provision does not apply to benefit
plans not covered by ERISA. See supra note 1. Section 514(b) exempts state laws regulating
"insurance, banking, or securities" as well as "generally applicable criminal law(s)" from
preemption. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(2)(A)(4) (1982).
The bill that became ERISA originally contained a limited preemption provision super-
seding only state regulation relating to subjects expressly covered by the bill. See H.R. REP.
No. 2, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. § 699(a) (1974) (as amended by the Senate). The Senate bill
provided for the preemption of state law relating to subject matters regulated by the Wel-
fare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act. See id. The House version of the bill provided for
preemption relating to the reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary responsibilities established in
Part 1 of the bill. See H.R. REP. No. 2, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. § 514(a) (1974).
In the Senate debates on the House version of the bill, Senator Javits explained the
difficulty with the limited preemption provision:
[The original provision] raised the possibility of endless litigation over the
validity of State action that might impinge on Federal regulation, as well as open-
ing the door to multiple and potentially conflicting State laws .... [On] balance,
the emergence of a comprehensive and pervasive Federal interest and the interests
of uniformity with respect to interstate plans required-but for certain excep-
tions-the displacement of State action in the field of private employee benefit
plans.
120 CONG. REc. 29942 (1974). The Conference Committee replaced the limited preemption
provision with the present one, indicating that its scope was as broad as its language. See
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); S. CONF. REP. No. 1090, 93rd Cong.,
2d Sess. (1974). Senator Williams, a sponsor of the Conference bill, stressed that the sub-
stantive and enforcement provisions of the revised bill were "intended to preempt the field
for Federal regulations, thus eliminating the threat of conflicting or inconsistent State and
local regulation of employee benefit plans." 120 CoNG. REC. 29933 (1974).
4 Cf. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 24 n.26 (1983)
(ERISA's preemption provision "virtually unique").
Historically, the supremacy of federal law was recognized in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), when a state law was held invalid under the supremacy clause of article
VI of the Constitution. As long as Congress acts pursuant to its constitutionally granted
power, a preemption question does not present a constitutional issue, although it may pose a
complex question of statutory interpretation. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 376
(1978). Due to the assumption that federal law is interstitial, preemption will not lightly be
presumed. Id., at 377; Hutchinson & Ifshin, supra note 1, at 35. The presumption of non-
preemption of a state law traditionally within the realm of the states is overcome only by
the "clear and manifest purpose of Congress." Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525
(1977) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
Two traditional tests for federal preemption have been developed by the Supreme
Court - whether there is a direct conflict between the federal and state action, or whether
Congress has intended to "occupy the field," thereby precluding state regulation in that
area. See Jones 430 U.S. at 525-26; Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S.
132, 142-46 (1963); L. TRIBE, supra, at 377; Turza & Halloway, Preemption of State Laws
Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 28 CATH. U.L. REV. 163, 175
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Case law construing the preemption provision demonstrates
that certain state laws clearly "relate to" employee benefit plans,"
while the connection of other laws with ERISA plans is remote.6
The precise boundary of ERISA preemption, however, has yet to
be determined;7 indeed, its perimeter varies according to which of
(1979).
The most extreme example of a direct conflict between state and federal law occurs
when compliance with both is a physical impossibility. See Florida Lime, 373 U.S. at 142-43;
Union Bridge Co. v. U.S., 204 U.S. 364, 399-401 (1907). A direct conflict may also take place
when compliance with the state statute frustrates the purpose of the federal law. L. TRME,
supra, at 378. In the absence of a direct conflict, federal occupation of a field will be found
only if "the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that the
Congress has unmistakably so ordained." Florida Lime, 373 U.S. at 142. "Occupation of the
field" analysis involves an examination of the scope of the federal statute to see whether
Congress intended the federal law to be the sole regulatory body in the area; if so, state law
falling within the ambit of the federal statute will be preempted. Turza & Halloway, supra,
at 176.
Congress has expressly manifested its intention of preemption with respect to ERISA in
§ 514(a). See 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1982); Kilberg & Inman, Preemption of State Laws Relating
to Employee Benefit Plans: An Analysis of ERISA Section 514, 62 TaY. L. Rav. 1313, 1315
(1984); Turza & Halloway, supra, at 178. With the enactment of section 514(a), Congress
has legislated a test for preemption with respect to ERISA: whether the state law in issue
"relate[s] to" a benefit plan within the meaning of section 514(a). See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)
(1982).
See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983) (New York stat-
utes requiring plans to provide benefits for pregnancy); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.,
451 U.S. 504, 525 (1981) (New Jersey law prohibiting offset of pension benefits by workers'
compensation benefits); Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp. v. flsley, 690 F.2d 323, 329 (2d Cir.
1982), aff'd sub nom., Arcudi v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 463 U.S. 1220 (1983) (mem.)
(Connecticut law requiring benefit plans to Iprovide health insurance to former employee
receiving workers' compensation benefits); Retail Shoe Health Comm'n v. Reminick, 62
N.Y.2d 173, 198, 464 N.E.2d 974, 998, 476 N.Y.S.2d 276, 292 (1984) (claim for breach of
fiduciary duty with respect to benefit plan), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2034 (1985).
6 See, e.g., Rebaldo v. Cuomo, 749 F.2d 133, 138-39 (2d Cir. 1984) (New York law pre-
cluding benefit plans from negotiating hospital inpatient charges other than as authorized
by statute), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2702 (1985); Saving & Profit Fund v. Gago, 717 F.2d
1038, 1039 (7th Cir. 1983) (state court order directing former husband to pay alimony from
his retirement income pursuant to Wisconsin's property distribution law); American Tel. &
Tel. Co. v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118, 121 (7th Cir. 1983) (garnishment order requiring former
husband to pay alimony from his retirement income).
7 See Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983); Alessi v. Raybestos-
Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 525 (1981) (Court noted in both cases that state laws in issue
did not require determination of the outer bounds of ERISA preemption). In the most re-
cent ERISA preemption case addressed by the Supreme Court, the state law in issue re-
quired the provision of minimum mental health-care benefits under a plan. See Metropoli-
tan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 105 S.Ct. 2380, 2383 (1985). Because this law required
the provision of specific benefits under a plan, it was similar to Shaw and other cases in
which the state law clearly "related to" the plan and thus did not represent the outer
boundary of ERISA preemption. See supra note 5.
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several theories analyzing ERISA preemption is used.8 The diffi-
culty of where to draw the line is apparent in the conflicting court
decisions in the area of state remedies enforcing rights under a
benefit plan.9 Recently, the New York Court of Appeals restricted
the reach of ERISA's preemption provision when it held in Sasso
v. Vachris0 that a New York statute providing a remedy for un-
paid contributions to an employee benefit plan was not preempted
by ERISA. 11
Plaintiffs in Sasso were trustees of an employee pension and
welfare trust fund who sought to recover payments which the Va-
car Construction Company ("Vacar") had failed to contribute to
8 See Note, supra note 1, at 151. The scope of ERISA preemption varies considerably
with the theory of preemption used. See id.; see also Kilberg & Inman, supra note 4, at 1320
(divergent approaches adopted by courts have narrowed or expanded "relate to" language to
reach desired results).
Courts have used traditional as well as non-traditional theories of preemption to ana-
lyze ERISA preemption issues. At least one court has used the "occupation of the field"
analysis. See Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 653 F.2d 1208, 1215-16 (8th Cir. 1981).
But see Kilberg & Inman, supra note 4, at 1315-16 (rejecting this approach). Other courts
have developed guidelines for preemption from the "purports to regulate, directly or indi-
rectly, the terms and conditions, of the plan" language from section 514(c)(2) of ERISA. See
Rebaldo v. Cuomo, 749 F.2d 133, 137 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2702 (1985);
Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp. v. Ilsley, 690 F.2d 323, 329 (2d Cir. 1982).
Analysis of whether there is a direct conflict between the state law and ERISA has
resulted in a narrow reading of ERISA's preemption clause. See, e.g., Lane v. Goren, 743
F.2d 1337, 1340 (9th Cir. 1984) (preemption of state laws limited to areas covered by
ERISA). The preemptive effect of ERISA has also been restricted by emphasizing the im-
portance of the state interest at stake, particularly in the area of domestic relations. See
Saving & Profit Fund v. Gago, 717 F.2d 1038, 1042 (7th Cir. 1983); American Tel. & Tel. Co.
v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118, 122 (7th Cir. 1983); Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F.
Supp. 388, 391 (E.D. Cal. 1981); infra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
Compare Authier v. Ginsberg, 757 F.2d 796, 801-02 (6th Cir. 1985) (common law re-
taliatory discharge action preempted upon court's conclusion that enforcement of ERISA is
solely a federal concern), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 208 (1985) and Dependahl v. Falstaff
Brewing Corp., 653 F.2d 1208, 1215-16 (8th Cir. 1981) (since ERISA provides plaintiff with
remedy, claim of tortious interference with benefit plan preempted) and Nedd v. United
Mine Workers of America, 488 F. Supp. 1208, 1213 (M.D. Pa. 1980) (in dictum, court holds
inconsistent state damage rules to be inapplicable to claims involving ERISA plans), with
Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Kenneth R. Ambrose, Inc., 727 F.2d 279, 282 n.5 (3d
Cir. 1983) (Pennsylvania statute holding corporate officers liable for unpaid contributions to
benefit plan not preempted by ERISA); Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pen-
sion Fund v. Kraftco, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 1061, 1072 (M.D. Tenn. 1984) (remedies provided
under ERISA additional to those provided under State law), afl'd, 780 F.2d 1020 (6th Cir.
1985); Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Alco Express Co., 522
F. Supp. 919, 922 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (state remedies in connection with benefit plans are
preserved).
10 66 N.Y.2d 28, 484 N.E.2d 1359, 494 N.Y.S.2d 856 (1985).
" See id. at 33, 484 N.E.2d at 1362, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 859.
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the fund. 12 The unpaid contributions were required by agreements
between the employees' union and Vacar.' 3 Plaintiffs brought a
claim against the shareholders of the corporation, pursuant to New
York Business Corporation Law ("BCL") section 630 which pro-
vides a remedy against the ten largest shareholders of a closely
held corporation for unpaid contributions to an employee benefit
plan.14 The Nassau County Supreme Court at Special Term held
that the plaintiffs' claim under section 630 was preempted by
ERISA.15 This ruling was affirmed by the Appellate Division, Sec-
ond Department. 16
12 See id. at 30, 484 N.E.2d at 1359-60, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 856-57. The trust fund of which
plaintiffs were trustees was established by Union 282 which was affiliated with the Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, chauffeur, Warehousemen and Helpers of America. Id.
1" Id., 484 N.E.2d at 1360, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 857.
,4 See id., 484 N.E.2d at 1360, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 857. Section 630 of N.Y. Business Cor-
poration Law (BCL) provides:
IT]he ten largest shareholders, as determined by the fair value of their beneficial
interest as of the beginning of the period during which the unpaid services re-
ferred to in this section are performed, of every corporation ... shall jointly and
severally be personally liable for all debts, wages or salaries due and owing to any
of its laborers, servants or employees other than contractors, for services per-
formed by them by such corporation.
N.Y.BUS.CORP.LAW. § 630(a) (McKinney Supp. 1986). Section 630(b) provides that wages or
salaries specifically include "employer contributions to or payments of insurance or welfare
benefits; employer contributions to pensions or annuity funds. ... ." Id.
A cause of action was brought against Vacar's officers under New York Labor Law sec-
tion 198-c as well. See Sasso, 66 N.Y.2d at 30, 484 N.E.2d at 360, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 857.
Special Term granted summary judgment for plaintiffs on this cause of action. See Sasso,
116 Misc. 2d 797, 800-02, 456 N.Y.S.2d 629, 632-33 (Sup. Ct. Spec. T. Nassau County 1982).
However, Appellate Division reversed this judgment, See Sasso, 106 App. Div. 2d 132, 141,
482 N.Y.S.2d 875, 881 (2d Dep't 1984), and this holding was not challenged on appeal to the
Court of Appeals. See Sasso, 66 N.Y.2d at 31, 484 N.E.2d at 1360, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 857.
Plaintiffs did not bring an action against Vacar Construction Company since the corpo-
ration had filed a bankruptcy petition. See Sasso, 66 N.Y.2d at 30, 484 N.E.2d at 1360, 494
N.Y.S.2d at 857. The filing of a bankruptcy petition stays the commencement of any judicial
action to recover a claim against the debtor. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (1982).
15 See Sasso v. Vachris, 116 Misc. 2d 797, 798-800, 456 N.Y.S.2d 629, 631-32 (Sup. Ct.
Spec. T. Nassau County 1982) Special Term found that the words of ERISA, its legislative
history, and case law construing its preemption provision established that the regulation of
employee benefit plans was "'exclusively a federal concern'" Id. at 799, 456 N.Y.S.2d at 631
(quoting Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981)). The lower court
noted that the civil enforcement provision of ERISA would preclude an action against the
shareholders and officers of a bankrupt corporation for unpaid employer contributions, and
concluded that section 630 of the BCL was preempted by section 514(a) of ERISA. See id.
at 799-800, 456 N.Y.S. at 632.
16 See Sasso v. Vachris, 106 App. Div. 2d 132, 141, 482 N.Y.S.2d 875, 881 (2d Dep't
1984). The Appellate Division reasoned that Special Term's ruling that BCL section 630 was
preempted by ERISA section 514(a) was proper since the preemption provision was in-
tended to have a broad effect and since remedies for delinquent contributions are provided
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The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Divi-
sion, holding that the statute was not preempted by section 514(a)
of ERISA.'7 Writing for the court, Judge Simons described section
630 as merely providing an additional enforcement mechanism to
recover contributions already owed to the plaintiffs.18 The statute
did not, according to Judge Simons, "regulate, directly or indi-
rectly, the terms and conditions" of the benefit plan. 9 The court
noted that, unlike laws regulating the provision or calculation of
specific benefits, the effect of section 630 on the trust fund was
remote.20 Relying on the United States Supreme Court's most re-
cent construction of ERISA's preemption clause in Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts,2' the court stressed that sec-
tion 630 regulated only the employer, not the content of a benefit
plan.22 Additionally, the court found that the enforcement provi-
for by ERISA. See id. at 136-141, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 878-81.
"7 See Sasso, 66 N.Y.2d at 30, 484 N.E.2d at 1359, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 856. The case was
remitted to the Nassau County Supreme Court to resolve the issues of whether defendant
Helen Vachris had received notice of the impending claim as required by BCL section 630
and whether the notice to defendant Charles Vachris was timely. See id. at 37, 484 N.E.2d
at 1364, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 861.
Defendants presented two alternative arguments against plaintiffs' claim under BCL
section 630, both of which were rejected by the court. See id. at 32-37, 484 N.E.2d at 1361-
64, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 858-61. First, defendants argued that because ERISA was intended to
occupy the field of employee benefit plans and because remedies for unpaid employer con-
tributions were explicitly provided for by ERISA, section 630 must be preempted. See id. at
32-33, 484 N.E.2d at 1361-62, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 858-59. Alternatively, defendants argued that
section 630 regulated the terms and conditions of the plan by imposing an additional sub-
stantive requirement on the employer beyond what was required by ERISA. See id. at 32,
484 N.E.2d at 1362, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 859.
18 See id. at 31-32, 33, 484 N.E.2d at 1360-61, 1362, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 857-58, 859.
19 See id. at 33, 484 N.E.2d at 1362, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 859 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(2)
(1982)); infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
20 See Sasso, 66 N.Y.2d at 33-34, 484 N.E.2d at 1362, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 859. The court
distinguished section 630 from laws requiring the provision of, inter alia, insurance coverage
for minimal mental health protection, workers' compensation, and disability payments for
pregnancy. See id. at 33-34, 484 N.E.2d at 1362, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 859. Additionally, the court
analogized section 630 to a law requiring the payment of alimony from retirement income
and to a law setting rates that hospitals must charge employee benefit plans; such laws had
been held as not "relating to" employee benefit plans since their connection to such plans
was remote. See id. at 34, 484 N.E.2d at 1362, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 859.
21 105 S.Ct. 2380 (1985).
22 See Sasso, 66 N.Y.2d at 34, 484 N.E.2d at 1362, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 860. The Supreme
Court in Metropolitan held that a Massachusetts statute specifying minimum mental
health-care benefits provided under insurance policies was not preempted by ERISA despite
the fact that the law "relate[d] to" employee health care plans; the law was saved from
preemption since it fell within the exemption for "laws regulating insurance" found in
ERISA section 514(b)(2)(A). See Metropolitan, 105 S.Ct. at 2390. Appellants had argued
that only laws regulating the insurer or the way in which insurance is sold came within the
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sions of ERISA, including recent amendments, did not indicate a
congressional intent to preempt state law remedies such as the one
provided by section 630.23
In determining that a state law remedy could be enforced de-
exemption for insurance. See id. The Court rejected this argument, reasoning that, unlike
the mandated-benefit law at issue, "laws that regulate only the insurer, or the way in which
it may sell insurance, do not 'relate to' benefit plans in the first instance." Id.
Relying on the distinction made in Metropolitan, the Court of Appeals characterized
section 630 as a law regulating an employer, analogizing it to a law regulating an insurer
which would not "relate to" a benefit plan. See Sasso, 66 N.Y.2d at 34, 484 N.E.2d at 1363,
494 N.Y.S.2d at 860.
23 See Sasso, 66 N.Y.2d at 34-35, 484 N.E.2d at 1363, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 860. The court
found that ERISA's original enforcement provision, found in 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), pro-
vided only equitable relief to enforce the federal statute or terms of the benefit plan. See id.
As for the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-364, 94
Stat. 1295 (1980) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1145 (1982)) (amendments to ERISA), the court
concluded that "[t]hey merely added a statutory obligation upon employers to make contri-
butions to multiemployer plans as required by the terms of the employee benefit plan or the
collective bargaining agreement... and provided a civil cause of action in favor of fiducia-
ries to enforce this obligation." Sasso, 66 N.Y.2d at 35, 484 N.E.2d at 1363, 494 N.Y.S.2d at
860 (citations omitted).
The court pointed to case law as well as to pertinent provisions in the legislative history
of the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 to indicate that ERISA's rem-
edies were intended to supplement rather than supersede existing state remedies. See Sasso,
66 N.Y.2d at 35-36, 484 N.E.2d at 1364, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 861. The court relied on a state-
ment from the Senate Labor and Finance Committees' joint explanation of S. 1076, which
contained the provisions that later became 29 U.S.C. sections 1145 and 1132(g). See id. at 36
n.4, 484 N.E.2d at 1364 n.4, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 861 n.4. That statement provides:
Under the bill, in the case of a civil action by any person to collect delinquent
multiemployer plan contributions, regardless of otherwise applicable law, in which
a judgment in favor of the plan is awarded, the court before which the action is
brought must award the plan (1) the unpaid contributions, (2) interest on the
unpaid contributions, (3) an amount equal to the greater of interest on the unpaid
contributions or liquidated damages provided for under the plan not to exceed 20
percent of the amount of delinquent contributions as determined by the court.
The bill preempts any State or other law which would prevent the award of rea-
sonable attorneys fees, court costs or liquidated damages or which would limit
liquidated damages to an amount below the 20 percent level.
However, the bill does not preclude the award of liquidated damages in excess
of the 20 percent level where an award of such a higher level of liquidated dam-
ages is permitted under applicable State or other law. This does not change any
other type of remedy permitted under State or Federal law with respect to delin-
quent multiemployer plan contributions.
126 CONG. REc. 20,202 (emphasis added). The court noted that the Report of the House
Ways and Means Committee "contained a virtually identical statement" and concluded that
"both Houses of Congress viewed the enforcement amendments of 1980 as setting forth a
floor of Federal remedy in the case of delinquent contributions below which the States could
not go but which did nit preempt or supersede State remedies that granted greater protec-
tion than that contained in ERISA." Sasso, 66 N.Y.2d at 36 n.4, 484 N.E.2d at 1364 n.4, 494
N.Y.S.2d at 861 n.4 (emphasis in original).
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spite ERISA's broad preemptive reach, the New York Court of Ap-
peals articulated a means by which to resolve issues falling in the
disputed gray area of ERISA preemption. This Comment will
demonstrate that the court in Sasso gave effect to legislative intent
by focusing on the language of ERISA's preemption clause, rather
than resorting to traditional federal preemption theories. It will
also be shown that Sasso contributed to further defining the
boundary of ERISA preemption by its analysis of whether the
state law in issue regulated the content of a benefit plan. A test for
ERISA preemption drawing upon the Sasso analysis will then be
proposed.
Sasso COURT REFRAINS FROM FOLLOWING OTHER FEDERAL
PREEMPTION THEORIES
In resolving the issue of the preemption of section 630, the
Court of Appeals did not resort to traditional federal preemption
theories as other courts addressing ERISA preemption issues have
done.24 The first of the traditional theories compares the state and
federal statute to see whether there is a direct conflict between the
two that would require the state statute's preemption.2 5 The sec-
ond traditional theory, used in the absence of a direct conflict, ex-
amines whether the scheme of the federal statute is sufficiently
comprehensive to denote a congressional intent to "occupy the
field" of the federal statute.26 Legislative' history indicates that di-
rect conflict analysis is vastly underinclusive as applied to ERISA
since congress intended preemption to extend to laws consistent
with ERISA as well.27 Furthermore, it is not necessary to examine
2, See, e.g., Authier v. Ginsberg, 757 F.2d 796, 801-02 (6th Cir. 1984) (analysis similar
to "occupying the field" used to determine whether Congress intended to make enforcement
of ERISA solely a federal concern); Lane v. Goren, 743 F.2d 1337, 1340 (9th Cir. 1984)
(direct-conflict analysis); Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 653 F.2d 1208, 1215-16 (8th
Cir. 1981) ("occupy the field" analysis); Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F. Supp.
388, 392 (E.D. Cal. 1981) (applies direct-conflict analysis to actions based on state consum-
ers' legal remedies and unfair business practice statutes).
2" See supra note 4.
"' See supra note 4.
27 See supra note 3. The bill that became ERISA originally contained a narrower pre-
emption clause that preempted only laws conflicting with the express provisions covered by
ERISA. See id. ERISA's present preemption clause requires the preemption of even those
laws consistent with ERISA, provided they "relate to" a benefit plan, as has been noted by
the Supreme Court. See Metropolitan, 105 S.Ct. at 2389; Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463
U.S. 85, 98-99 (1983); Kilberg & Inman, supra note 4, at 1321-24; Note, supra note 1, at
151-52.
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the scope of ERISA to discern an intgnt to "occupy the field" since
Congress has expressly indicated its preemptive intent in section
514(a). 28 Thus, inasmuch as these traditional tests are of limited
value in analyzing ERISA preemption, the Court of Appeals gave
effect to the unique congressional intention of preemption with re-
spect to ERISA by avoiding them.
Another approach to ERISA preemption which the Court of
Appeals declined to use analyzes the nature of the state law, invok-
ing a presumption of non-preemption when the state law regulates
an area traditionally within the realm of the states. 29 This ap-
proach was used by one court which held in a domestic relations
case that a state garnishment order against a former husband's
pension fund to meet support obligations owed his former wife was
not preempted by ERISA.30 In emphasizing the maintenance of
traditional areas of state control, this approach varies the weight
given ERISA's preemption clause according to the nature of the
state activity in issue although no justification for doing so exists
in the statute."1 Section 514(a) indicates that Congress intended to
preempt all state activity relating to ERISA plans, regardless of
whether the activity regulates an area traditionally left to the
states.3 2 It is asserted that the Sasso court adhered to legislative
28 See Kilberg & Inman, supra note 4, at 1315-16 ("occupation of the field" analysis
inapplicable since ERISA contains an express preemption provision).
29 See supra note 8; see also Note, supra note 1, at 164-65 (advocates, inter alia, use of
state-interest approach in its proposal for ERISA preemption analysis); but see Gilbert v.
Burlington Indus., 765 F.2d 320, 327 (2d Cir. 1985) (to avoid preemption it is not sufficient
that state statute represent exercise of traditional police power); Kilberg & Inman, supra
note 4, at 1326 (criticizing state-interest approach).
Plaintiffs in Sasso had argued against the preemption of BCL section 630, claiming that
it was an exercise of the state's police power. See Brief for Appellants at 22-24. The Court of
Appeals noted a general presumption of non-preemption of a state law by a federal statute
but did not give more weight to this based on the important state concern implicated by
section 630 as plaintiffs had advocated. See Sasso, 66 N.Y.2d at 33-36, 484 N.E.2d at 1362-
64, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 859-61.
30 See American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118, 118 (2d Cir. 1979).
21 The only types of state laws that are distinguished in ERISA are laws regulating
insurance, banking, and securities, and generally applicable criminal laws. See 29 U.S.C. §
1144(b) (1982). These laws were expressly exempted from ERISA preemption. See id. While
this Comment criticizes use of the state-interest approach, it is submitted that courts hold-
ing that orders to pay alimony from retirement income are not preempted have reached the
correct result. Since court orders to pay alimony do not affect a benefit plan's content or
administration, Congress did not intend such orders to be preempted by ERISA. See infra
note 48 and accompanying text.
22 See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982); see also Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 98-
99 (1983) (Congress intended to preempt all laws relating to ERISA plans).
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intent by refusing to vary the weight given the preemption clause
according to the nature of the state law in issue.
USE OF THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE OF ERISA IN Sasso
The court in Sasso resolved the preemption issue by determin-
ing whether section 630 "relate[d] to" plaintiffs' benefit plan.33
The court reasoned that a law could be considered as relating to an
ERISA plan if it "regulate[d], directly or indirectly, the terms and
conditions" of the plan.3 4 This language, which has been used as a
standard for ERISA's preemption by several federal courts,3 5 de-
rives from section 514(c)(2) of ERISA in which Congress defined
the term "State" for the purposes of ERISA's preemption provi-
sion in 514(a).36 Section 514(c)(2) defines "State" as including a
state, its political subdivisions, "or any agency or instrumentality
of either which purports to regulate, directly or indirectly, the
terms and conditions of [ERISA] plans. '37
In using this as a standard for preemption, the Court of Ap-
peals interpreted this language as limiting the kinds of state activ-
ity subject to preemption; that is, in order, for a state law to "relate
to" an ERISA plan, it must "regulate ... the terms and condi-
tions" of the plan. 8 This view rests on the presupposition that the
clause following "which" in section 514(c)(2) was intended to mod-
ify, not only the terms immediately preceding it ("agency or in-
strumentality"), but the other preceding terms as well (including
the word "State"). This interpretation, though shared by several
federal courts,89 is arguably ambiguous,40 and has not been adopted
33 See Sasso, 66 N.Y.2d at 33, 484 N.E.2d at 1362, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 859.
Id. at 33, 484 N.E.2d at 1362, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 859 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(2)).
35 See Rebaldo v. Cuomo, 749 F.2d 133, 137 (2d Cir. 1984); Lane v. Goren, 743 F.2d
1337, 1339 (9th Cir. 1984); Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp. v. Ilsley, 609 F.2d 323, 329 (2d Cir.
1982).
11 See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(2) (1982).
37 Id. (emphasis added).
38 See Sasso, 66 N.Y.2d at 33, 484 N.E.2d at 1362, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 859.
"' See supra note 35.
10 See H.R. REP. No. 1785, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47-48 (1977). This report, issued by the
House Committee on Education and Labor three years after the passage of ERISA, states
that the phrase "purports to regulate, directly or indirectly, the terms and conditions" was
intended to modify only the words "agency or instrumentality" and was not intended to
modify the word "State." See id. While this post-hoc report has only limited weight, the
interpretation suggested by it coincides with the unusually broad effect Congress intended
ERISA's preemption provision to have. See H.R. CONP. REP. No. 1280, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess.
383 (1974); S. CONP. REP. No. 1090, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 383 (1974); see also Metropolitan
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by the United States Supreme Court.41 However, even if the
phrase in question was not intended to modify the word "State"
and does not operate as an express limit to the preemption clause,
the phrase is indicative of the kind of activity Congress had in
mind as being subject to preemption. It is submitted, therefore,
that the Sasso court's "regulates . . . the terms and conditions"
standard should be regarded as a useful criterion, though not a
verbatim or all-inclusive test for ERISA preemption.
Sasso COURT DEVELOPS CONTENT-BASED PREEMPTION TEST
The Court of Appeals used the following test to decide
whether section 630 of the BCL regulated the terms and conditions
of plaintiffs' plan: whether the New York statute either mandated
or prohibited the provision of specific benefits under the plan or
otherwise regulated the plan's content.42 In developing this con-
tent-based test for preemption, the court relied on the construction
of ERISA's preemption provision used in Metropolitan Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Massachusetts.43 The United States Supreme Court in
Metropolitan distinguished laws regulating an insurer or the trans-
action of selling insurance from those regulating the substantive
terms of insurance contracts, noting that the former did not "re-
late to" employee benefit plans." The Court of Appeals analogized
laws regulating an insurer to those regulating an employer and rea-
soned that, unlike laws regulating the content of a plan itself, those
regulating only an employer did not "relate to" a plan.45 It is sub-
mitted that, while the analogy is sound as applied to section 630,
Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 105 S.Ct. 2380, 2389 (1985); Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S.
85, 98 (1983). There is no suggestion in ERISA's legislative history that these words were
intended to limit the effect of the preemption provision. See generally LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF ERISA (1974); see also Authier v. Ginsberg, 757 F.2d 796, 799 n.4 (questioning use of
"terms and conditions" language to limit ERISA's preemptive effect). But see Rebaldo v.
Cuomo, 749 F.2d 133, 137 n.1 (2d Cir. 1984) (rejects view presented by post-hoc report of
House Committee on Education and Labor as lacking even persuasive authority).
4' See generally Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 105 S.Ct.
2380 (1985); see also Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 91 & n.6 (1983); Alessi v.
Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 525 (1981). Indeed, in Alessi, the Supreme Court
interpreted the phrase "purports to regulate, directly or indirectly, the terms and condi-
tions" as indicating the breadth of ERISA's preemption clause. See Alessi, 451 U.S. at 525.
'2 See Sasso, 66 N.Y.2d at 33-34, 484 N.E.2d at 1362-63; 494 N.Y.S.2d at 859-60.
43 471 U.S. 724, 105 S.Ct. 2380 (1985); see Sasso, 66 N.Y.2d at 34, 484 N.E.2d at 1363,
494 N.Y.S.2d at 860.
See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 105 S.Ct. 2380, 2390; supra note 22.
See Sasso, 66 N.Y.2d at 34, 484 N.E.2d at 1363, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 860.
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the transition from insurer to employer is a rather broad leap and
creates dangerous precedent. A law regulating an employer differs
from one regulating an insurer in that it is much more likely to
relate to an employee benefit plan.46
Nevertheless, it is submitted that, by focusing on the words of
the federal statute and its legislative history 7 rather than resorting
to traditional preemption theories as other courts have done, the
Sasso court has given effect to the unique congressional intention
of preemption expressed in section 514(a). The content-based test
for preemption derived from the language of ERISA provides a
means to discern legislative intent despite the imprecision of the
"relate to" clause. It is suggested that the Sasso test falls short of
ascertaining legislative intent only to the extent that it does not
require the preemption of laws regulating the administration of
employee benefit plans. ERISA and its legislative history indicate
that such laws were intended to be preempted as well. 48
A test for ERISA preemption can, therefore, be derived from
the preceding discussion of the merits and deficiencies of Sasso.
The issue of whether Congress intended a particular state law to
be preempted by ERISA is resolved by determining whether the
law in issue "relates to" an ERISA plan. This determination turns
on whether the law requires or prohibits the provisions of specific
benefits under the plan or otherwise regulates the plan's content or
administration. Specific references to the type of state law in issue
in either ERISA or its legislative history may also aid in discerning
legislative intent to preempt a particular state law, though such
references will not likely be dispositive.
46 It is foreseeable that Sasso's interpretation of Metropolitan could be relied on to
refuse to preempt laws regulating the administration of employee benefit plans by analogiz-
ing such laws to laws regulating the transaction of selling insurance. See supra note 22. It is
submitted that such an analogy would frustrate congressional intent in that Congress in-
tended ERISA to preempt state laws regulating administration of benefit plans. See infra
note 48.
4 See supra note 23.
48 See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982). The policy of ERISA is to assure that "disclosure be
made and safeguards be provided with respect to the establishment, operation, and admin-
istration of such plans." Id. (emphasis added). Sections 101-306 of ERISA (codified at 29
U.S.C. §§ 1021-1086 (1982)) regulate administration of benefit plans by establishing require-
ments for reporting, disclosure, participation, vesting, and funding of plans. See H.R. REP.
No. 533, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1974). Cf. Gilbert v. Burlington Indus., 765 F.2d 320, 326-
28 (2d Cir. 1985) (content, structure or administration of plan test for ERISA preemption);
Rebaldo v. Cuomo, 749 F.2d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 1984) (test for ERISA preemption is whether
law affects structure, administration or type of benefits provided under a plan).
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CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals in Sasso produced a well-reasoned con-
struction of legislative intent in holding a state remedy not pre-
empted despite the broad reach of ERISA's preemption clause.
The content-based test developed in Sasso, which enabled the
court to reconcile ERISA's preemptive mandate with the preserva-
tion of a state remedy, advances the effort to define the outer
boundary of ERISA preemption. As the outer boundary of ERISA
preemption continues to be defined, use of the proper analysis will
become increasingly critical if courts are to give effect to the
unique Congressional expression of preemption in section 514(a).
Patricia Loftus-Matthews
